

Water Governance Reforms Lessons from Australia

Prof Mike Young, Director, The Environment Institute

Research Chair, Water Economics and Management

The University of Adelaide

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Good governance

- Possible only if the detail is well specified
- Robust
 - Able to withstand the test of time
 - Expected to endure
- Attend to the fundamental architecture
- Facilitate the autonomous emergence of a triple bottom line





Water reform in Australia

- Two decades into the process of trying to fix governance
- Commitment to restoring systems to health
- Commitment to development of robust entitlement and allocation regimes
- Commitment to the development of markets to facilitate adjustment, innovation and investment

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
Definitions

- System
 - Catchments, rivers, groundwater, etc
- Regime
 - Rules, rights, obligations, administration
- Entitlements
 - Long-term interest (property right)
- Allocations
 - Water available for extraction
- Use approval
 - Consent to apply water to land






Running out of water








With half as much water





Private benefits of trading







LESSONS

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1: The legacy of prior decisions and arrangements allowed reforms to erode system health and community well-being

- Design entitlement and allocation regimes for trading
- Otherwise markets will elegantly reveal how flawed your regime is!
 - Over-allocation
 - Double counting (Double allocation)
 - Inefficient inter-seasonal stock management








2: Define entitlements as shares rather than volumes and don't specify reliabilities

- Risk of adverse shifts in water availability have to be fully assigned
 - Individuals via seniority allocation systems
 - Defined "security" pools so that
 - individuals can manage risk; and
 - trading possible at low cost



3: Improve market efficiency by unbundling and standardising products





4: Establish accurate entitlement registers

- As trading develops entitlements become extremely valuable
- Registration systems need to be accurate
- Trading costs will be lower if central registers rather than pieces of paper are used to define ownership





5: Install meters and convert to a volumetric allocation regime

- Without meters, an allocation system must be run very conservatively
- Metering and conversion to volumetric allocations enables much greater control
- Critical to establish a compliance culture
- But also makes it easier to allocate too much water to users





6: Allow unused water to be carried forward

- For trading to produce efficient inter-temporal outcomes, it must be possible to store rather than sell allocations
- Otherwise too much water will be sold during dry times and a suboptimal amount stored



7: Robust planning and water entitlement regimes are essential. Communities rarely plan for severe adversity!





Figure 3. Murray System inflows sorted in ascending order for all years 1892-93 to 2008-09 (excluding Snowy and Menindee inflows)

8: Specify minimum flow obligations separately from environmental and consumptive entitlements



9: Account for all significant forms of water use including those that cannot be metered

- It is better to be approximately right than comprehensively wrong
- Require the offset of all activities that significantly intercept inflows and/or reduce return flows
 - Forests, small dams, groundwater, return flow erosion, overland flow capture







10: Manage connected ground and surface water systems as one integrated system.

- Critical to manage inter-connectivity among resources; and
- Assign climatic risks among connected resources
 - Do river users have priority over groundwater users?
 - Vice versa



11: Charge all users to lower bound cost and preferably the upper bound cost of supply

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- Markets lead to inefficient outcomes if pricing principles are inconsistent
- Lower bound costs => costs of supply and maintenance
- Upper bound costs => Lower bound costs plus return on capital
- Establish irrigator-owned supply companies



12: Manage environmental externalities using separate instruments

- Costs have to be avoidable incentives matter
- Pricing to "include the cost of externalities" ends up as a fixed cost with little incentive to manage them
- Every objective needs a separate instrument





13: Remove administrate impediments to trade

- Time costs money
- Allocation trading rules and protocols should be pre-specified and automatic



14: Allocate entitlements to individual users rather than regional supply companies

- Encourage competition
- When entitlements are allocated to water supply companies rather than individuals they erect barriers to protect "their" infrastructure
- Individuals are more likely to trade if they can sell to the highest bidder rather than the highest bidder within their district



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15: Establish clear announcement disciplines

- When supply is scarce and markets exist, there are significant opportunities for insider trading
- Make announcements at consistent times and in a consistent manner right across the system





16: Make timely price information available

- Markets rely upon information
- All need to be equally informed
- Brokers can supply this service







17: Avoid government involvement in the provision of water brokering services.

- Accusations of conflict of interest are made when the market maker has water for sale
- Governments should leave water broking to water brokers
- <u>www.waterfind.com.au</u>
- www.waterexchange.com.au



What we got right

- 1. Installing meters
- 2. Enforcing compliance with licensed volume
- 3. Defining entitlements as shares
- 4. Pools of differing reliability
- 5. Unbundling to get control and transaction costs down
- 6. Allocation announcement discipline







What we are now tackling

- Independent basin-wide administrative structures
- Solving over-allocation and keeping it in balance
- Facing up to climate change





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Some mistakes we made -Regime arrangements

- 1. System connectivity => manage GW and SW as one
- 2. Capped the wrong thing => cap entitlement potential not use
- 3. Return flows => account for them
- 4. Unmetered uses => include them
- 5. Climate change => plan for an adverse shift
- 6. The environment's share => define it and allocate to it
- 7. Storage Management => include in trading regime
- 2. Individual arrangements
 - 1. Registers => validate them early
 - 2. Entitlements => define entitlements as shares
 - 3. Trading => forgot to get the costs and time to settle down
 - 4. Not enough instruments => needed to unbundle
 - 5. Inter-seasonal risk management => allow markets to optimize carry forward
 - 6. Company control => allocate to individuals

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Prof. Mike Young The Environment Institute The University of Adelaide Email: Mike.Young@adelaide.edu.au





Goulburn Murray Water

HISTORICAL SEASONAL ALLOCATIONS

(% of water right until 2006/07, then percentage of high-reliability water shares)

Season	Murray Final	Broken Final	Goulburn Final	Campaspe Final	Loddon Final	Bullarook Creek Final
1992/1993	200+	-	200+	200+	-	-
1993/1994	200+	-	200+	200+	-	-
1994/1995	220	-	200	180	-	-
1995/1996	200	-	150	200	-	-
1996/1997	200	-	200	220	-	-
1997/1998	130	170	120	190	-	190
1998/1999	200	170	100	100	-	190
1999/2000	190	170	100	100	-	190
2000/2001	200	170	100	220	-	190
2001/2002	200	170	100	180	-	190
2002/2003	129	100	57	100	-	170
2003/2004	100	170	100	100	67	177
2004/2005	100	170	100	39	100	190
2005/2006	144	170	100	31	100	190
2006/2007	95	77	29	0	0	36
2007/2008	43	71	57	18	5	0